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Conflicting Standards for Applying the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
I. INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communica-
tions between client and attorney from forced disclosure.' Dating
back to at least 1577,2 the privilege arose from the belief that it was
a point of honor for the attorney to keep his client's confidences.'
The modern rationale for the privilege, however, is the perceived
need to encourage full and frank discussion between attorney and
client by removing the fear of forced disclosure.' Thus, the privilege
rests on the premise that the social benefits derived from uninhib-
ited communication and from the attorney's access to all the facts5
outweigh the detrimental effects of concealing information during
trial.' This premise is untested, however, and the modern trend to-
ward expanded discovery 7 militates toward a narrow construction
1. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961):
~ (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
2. Id. § 2290, at 542 n.1.
3. Early proponents of the privilege considered it personal to the attorney, rather than
to the client. It served the attorney by "permitting him to keep the secrets confided in him
by his client and thus preserve his honor." In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
aff'd sub nom. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
951 (1963).
4. Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association
provides that "[a] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmnirry, Canon 4. Similarly, Dean McCormick has noted:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for the party
whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the relationship, and this
sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our customs so as to make the
lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the client's confidential disclosures re-
garding professional business. Loyalty and sentiment are silken threads, but they are
hard to break.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 176 (2d ed. 1972).
5. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test,
84 HARv. L. REV. 424, 425 (1970) (stating that "[b]enefits arise under the commonly held
assumption that an attorney best serves his client, and indirectly the entire society, if he has
access to all relevant information"). For a discussion of a Yale study conducted to test the
accuracy of this assumption, see id. at 425 n.7.
6. Jeremy Bentham, an especially strong critic of the attorney-client privilege, noted
that the worst consequence of abolishing the privilege would be "[t]hat a guilty person will
not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance from his law adviser, in the way of
concerting a false defence, as he may do at present." J. BENMHAm, Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAm 473 (Bowring ed. 1842), reprinted in 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 549.
7. The liberal discovery policies of modern procedural rules are justified on the premise
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of the privilege.'
The inherent conflict between broad application of the attor-
ney-client privilege to promote open communication and limitation
of the privilege to ensure judicial *access to pertinent information is
of particular importance in the corporate setting. Unlike the indi-
vidual client, the corporation is by nature an artificial legal entity
that can communicate only through agents. Courts attempting to
determine the applicability of the attorney-client privilege must
therefore ascertain which corporate employees are properly consid-
ered "clients" of corporate counsel.' The difficulty of this inquiry is
compounded by the necessity of determining whether the advice
sought by the corporation concerned business matters rather than
strictly legal advice.'" Finally, the vast organizational differences
among corporate entities and the broad range of activities that give
rise to litigation make promulgation of a uniform and just standard
extremely difficult. 1
Federal courts are split on the question of what standards
should be applied to determine who is entitled to the protection of
the corporation's attorney-client privilege. Judicial responses to
this question run the gamut from a very comprehensive application
of the privilege'" to a narrow application protecting only the man-
agement of the corporation.'3 Because the Supreme Court has pro-
vided no guidelines for applying the corporate attorney-client privi-
lege, 4 this area remains unpredictable for corporate attorneys.
This Recent Development traces the development of the prin-
that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts . . . is essential to proper litigation."
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). See also Advisory Committee Comments to
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
8. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554 (the privilege should be "strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle").
9. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04], at
38-39.
10. Id. 503(a)(1)[01], at 20-22. The growth of in-house corporate counsel has contrib-
uted to the problem of separating legal advice from business advice for purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege. Some commentators have asserted that when in-house counsel is con-
cerned, the boundary between legal advice and business advice becomes too dim for the
privilege to apply. See, e.g., Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate
Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DEr. L.J. 299, 354-62 (1963). But see Kobak, The
Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6
GA. L. REV. 339, 353 (1972) (suggesting that "subordinate house counsel in large corporations
[are] specialists so keenly aware of the dimensions of their roles that they would ordinarily
abjure business admonitions better left to management or other business personnel").
11. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, 503[02], at 16.
12. See text accompanying notes 49-63 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 26-43 & 73-82 infra.
14. See Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem.
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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cipal tests utilized by federal courts to determine the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting and evalu-
ates the various criticisms leveled at each test. After examining the
recent trend toward broadening the scope of the privilege, the Re-
cent Development analyzes decisions in the Third and Sixth Cir-
cuits that adhere to the traditional, stricter standards for invoking
the privilege. Although the competing policies underlying the privi-
lege and its limitations impede the formulation of a comprehensive
standard, this Recent Development concludes that the Third and
Sixth Circuit tests accord more nearly with modern concepts of lib-
eral discovery and provide sufficient protection for the interests of
the corporation.
I1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Prior to 1962 the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
to corporate employees was unquestioned. The seminal decision in
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.'5 held that the priv-
ilege extended to "information furnished by an officer or employee
of the [corporation] in confidence and without the presence of third
persons.""6 By according corporations the same protection enjoyed
by individuals, the court provided an easily applied standard that
attorneys and clients could rely upon. The court, however, did not
confront the problems posed by the differences between individuals
and corporations,'7 nor did it explain why a corporation should be
entitled to such extensive protection. Moreover, the United Shoe
test ran counter to Supreme Court dictum in Hickman v. Taylor,"
in which the Court enunciated the work product doctrine." In
Hickman the Court stated that although memoranda prepared by
15. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
16. Id. at 359.
17. Among the problems raised by equating an individual with a corporation for pur-
poses of applying the privilege are the division of corporate employees into information-prov-
iders and decisionmakers; the difficulty of conducting discovery of employees who may be
widely dispersed geographically; the problem of confidentiality; and the determination
whether the advice sought was legal rather than business advice. See generally 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, 503(b)[04], and text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
18. 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
19. The qualified immunity for an attorney's work product was codified in 1970 as
follows:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discovera-
ble under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative . . .only upon
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
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corporate counsel of interviews with the corporation's lower-level
employees were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, they
were entitled to the more limited immunity of the work product
rule. Thus, the Hickman Court appeared to espouse a more limited
view of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corpo-
rate clients than that subsequently formulated by the district court
in United Shoe.2"
In 1962 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
abruptly shattered judicial complacency with the United Shoe test
in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association21 by com-
pletely refusing to apply the attorney-client privilege in the corpo-
rate setting. Drawing an analogy between the attorney-client privi-
lege and the privilege against self-incrimination, the court held
that both privileges were personal and therefore could be exercised
only by an individual."2 The court feared the potential abuse that a
comprehensive application of the privilege might engender in the
corporate setting. Moreover, the court noted that the corporation
could develop a broad "zone of silence" to protect all employees'
communications, whether made in preparation for litigation or not,
by routing them through the attorney's office. 23 Thus, the court
concluded that a corporation is not entitled to the attorney-client
privilege.
Although reversed on appeal,24 Radiant Burners led later
courts25 to reconsider the justifications for the attorney-client privi-
lege and the extent to which that privilege protects communica-
tions of corporate employees. Specifically, federal courts have de-
veloped two principal tests to determine the scope of the attorney-
client privilege in the corporate setting.
A. The Control Group Test
Prior to the Seventh Circuit reversal of Radiant Burners, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered
20. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360, 370-71 (1970).
21. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Il. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 929 (1963).
22. 207 F. Supp. at 773 (citing Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923), and
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) as authority for denying the corporation the
right to the privilege against self-incrimination).
23. 207 F. Supp. at 774-75.
24. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963).




the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporate
setting in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 6 In-
fluenced by the reasoning in Radiant Burners, the court formulated
the control group test.27 Although it refused to follow the Radiant
Burners holding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to
corporations, the Westinghouse court also declined to adopt United
Shoe's broad application of the privilege because of the perceived
conflict with Hickman v. Taylor."8 Instead, the court focused on
whether the corporation was seeking legal advice when the chal-
lenged communication was made. Reasoning that the communicat-
ing employee, in order to "personify" the corporation, must be able
to take some action on behalf of the corporation to put the advice
into effect, the court held that only those employees who are in a
position to "control or even to take a substantial part in a decision
about any action which the corporation may take"'2 represent the
corporate client for purposes of the privilege. Employees not in
such a position would merely be giving the corporate lawyer infor-
mation that would enable him to advise those in control of the
corporation."
Following Westinghouse, federal courts almost uniformly
adopted the control group test." Proponents of this test,32 noting its
26. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohib. denied sub nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
27. The district court in Westinghouse posed the test as follows:
[11f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a posi-
tion to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which
the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized
member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personi-
fies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would
apply.
210 F. Supp. at 485.
28. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. For the argument
that the Westinghouse court erred in its concern about a possible conflict with Hickman v.
Taylor, see Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 873, 875 (1971).
29. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (1962).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, No. 79-886 (Mar. 17, 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d
Cir. 1979); Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d
686 (10th Cir. 1968); Congoleum Indus. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd
mem., 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973).
In response to this wide acceptance of the control group test, the drafters of the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence defined "representative of the client" for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege as "one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to
act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client." Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
503(a)(3). Subsequent judicial criticism of the test, however, led the drafters to omit this
definition, leaving the controversy to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. See Proposed Rules
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predictability and ease of application, first justify restriction of the
privilege on the basis of the differences between individual and cor-
porate litigants. Unlike an individual, a corporation usually has no
single agent with access to all the information about the corpora-
tion's activities. Hence, the corporation's counsel, in a position to
confer with a range of corporate employees, may possess a uniquely
comprehensive knowledge of these activities. The plaintiff suing an
individual has the relatively easy task of conducting discovery on a
single person. The plaintiff suing a corporation, however, will be
able to conduct comparable discovery-if at allP3-only at much
greater cost and labor." A second reason for limiting the attorney-
client privilege is that the two primary justifications for the privi-
lege-the client's reliance on the confidentiality of his communica-
tions and his appreciation of the consequences of disclosure if the
privilege were unavailable-may be inapplicable in the corporate
setting. 5 The prospect that communications to the attorney will be
kept strictly confidential is small in the corporate setting, where
memoranda typically pass through several hands before reaching
the attorney and are subsequently filed within access of other cor-
porate employees. In addition, lower-level employees are likely to
communicate to the attorney whatever information their superiors
have instructed them to divulge without concern for whether subse-
quent disclosure by the attorney would tend to injure the corpora-
tion. Finally, advocates of the control group test, echoing the con-
cerns of the Radiant Burners court, 36 consider the test a hedge
against the abusive creation of a "zone of silence" around corporate
communications.3 7
of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 222-25 (1973).
32. See Note, supra note 5 (presenting a summary of the arguments in favor of the
control group test's limited standards). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, stating:
[The privilege's] benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and
concrete . . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonethe-
less an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.
Id. § 2291, at 554.
33. The plaintiff's effort to conduct discovery of an employee's statements to counsel
may be blocked if the employee has left the corporation or died, has moved beyond the reach
of affordable discovery, or has forgotten the pertinent information.
34. See Note, supra note 5, at 427.
35. Id. at 427-29.
36. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 929 (1963); see text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
37. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953 (1956):
Where corporations are involved, with their large number of agents, masses of docu-
ments, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large. Few
1004 [Vol. 33:999
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Critics of the control group test"8 rely on three main conten-
tions. First, detractors argue that to equate only the corporation's
"control group" with the individual is artificial and unrealistic.
The corporation consists of both information-providers and deci-
sionmakers who are not typically embodied in one person. Exclu-
sion of nonmanagement informatiofi-providers from protection of
the privilege ignores the necessity for corporate counsel to obtain
information available only from lower-level employees before coun-
seling the decisionmakers. Counsel is therefore presented with a
"Hobson's choice."3' By interviewing only those who control the
corporation, counsel risks being unable to obtain all the informa-
tion needed to prepare his case. If he seeks the information from
nonmanagement employees, however, he risks forced disclosure due
to the inapplicability of the privilege. Thus, the attorney may be
inhibited in his pursuit of all the facts.
Second, critics question whether the control group test can be
easily applied so as to create a dependable guide on which clients
and attorneys may rely.4" Given the vast number of documents in-
volved in corporate litigation, the diversity of the situations calling
for attorney consultation, and the difficulty of determining the
communicant's authority and control, it is impossible for a court to
apply a completely objective standard. Consequently, application
of a "bright line" test for determining the coverage of the attorney-
client privilege must still be accompanied by some subjective
reasoning."
Third, detractors of the control group test argue that applica-
tion of an objective standard does not eliminate the possibility of
abuse of the privilege.42 Because an objective test concentrates on
identifying the communicant rather than on scrutinizing the nature
of his communication, it is arguably easier for abuse to escape de-
tection under the control group test than under a more subjective
weighing of all the facts. In addition, it is unlikely that forcing an
attorney who routinely rubber-stamps all communications routed
judges-or legislators either, for that matter-would long tolerate any common law
privilege that allowed corporations to insulate all their activities by discussing them
with legal advisers. It is this risk, and this challenge, that underlie a number of attor-
ney-client privilege problems peculiar to corporations.
Id. at 955-56.
38. See Kobak, supra note 10; Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege,
PRAc. LAW. Nov. 1969, at 15.
39. This argument for a broad privilege has been tendered by many commentators.
See, e.g., Weinschel, supra note 28, at 876. See also note 71 infra.
40. See Kobak, supra note 10, at 368.
41. Id.
42. See text accompanying notes 22-23 & 36-37 supra.
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through his office to divulge what he knows about a particular
memorandum will prove to be a valuable discovery tool.43 Thus,
reliance on the control group test as an effective means of prevent-
ing abuse of the privilege may be misplaced.
Beset by such strong and persistent criticism, some courts be-
gan to question the efficacy of the control group test. Taking into
consideration the potential for injustice that application of any ar-
bitrary standard involves, these courts searched for a more mean-
ingful set of factors for determining whether a particular communi-
cant represents the corporate client.
B. The Subject Matter Test
The first case to reconsider the control group test was Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker." In considering whether the
privilege protected debriefing memoranda given to corporate coun-
sel by several lower-level employees, the court rejected as inade-
quate the control group test.45 In its place the court formulated a
new test based on two criteria: whether the employee's communi-
cation to the attorney was directed by his superior; and whether
the subject matter of the communication concerned the perform-
ance of his duties as employee.46 The court thus endorsed a broad
application of the attorney-client privilege, based not upon the em-
ployee's ability to direct further actions of the corporation on coun-
sel's advice, but rather upon a determination that those in control
had authorized the employee to communicate the information to
the attorney. The test was so broad, however, that it potentially
could extend the privilege to any employee in the corporation, ex-
cept those whose access to information was purely "fortuitous.""
The Harper standard responds to a principal criticism of the
control group test-that it attempts to equate the essentially irrec-
oncilable concepts of the individual and the corporation-by recog-
nizing that the corporation's information-providers may not be
identical to its decisionmakers. Opponents of the Harper test, how-
ever, criticize it on several grounds. First, because of its broad ap-
43. See Miller, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262,
267 n.21 (1963).
44. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971).
45. 423 F.2d at 491.
46. Id. at 491-92. See also D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388
P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964), which formulated a similar test.
47. The fortuitous witness exception is necessary to avoid a conflict with Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
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plication to employees at all levels of the corporate structure, the
test has the potential of creating a "zone of silence"' that could
shield vast amounts of information from discovery. This criticism
appears particularly apt in light of the expanded scope of discovery
espoused by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Second, it is
questionable whether such a broad application fulfills the underly-
ing rationale for the privilege: the encouragement of full and frank
communication with the attorney. 0 The confidentiality of an em-
ployee's communication is often doubtful because it may pass
through a number of hands before reaching the attorney. Hence,
the availability of the privilege may give the employee little incen-
tive to consult corporate counsel. In addition, the existence of non-
legal reasons for seeking the advice of an attorney may outweigh
any fear on the part of the corporation that the privilege will not
apply.5" In the face of such uncertainty whether the attorney-client
privilege actually achieves open communication in the corporate
setting, the harm to opposing parties caused by insulating so much
information from discovery is significant.
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed Harper without opin-
ion by an equally divided vote5" and put an end to hopes that the
nation's highest court would resolve the federal courts' conflict over
the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege. Thus, debate
surrounding Harper continued, and federal courts remained free to
accept either the control group test or the subject matter test or to
formulate other standards.
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith' s the Eighth Circuit
rejected the control group test largely because it objected to the
artificial distinction between information-providers and deci-
sionmakers imposed by that test. The court refused, however, to
apply the Harper standard's broad protection. Instead, the Diversi-
fied court modified the Harper test along the lines suggested by
Judge Weinstein" by requiring the corporation to satisfy a five-part
test: first, the employee must have made the communication for
the purpose of securing legal advice; second, the communication
must have been made at the request of the employee's superior;
third, the superior requesting the communication must have done
48. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
50. See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
51. For a fuller discussion of this question, see Note, supra note 5, at 428.
52. Decker v. Harper & Row Pub., Inc., 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
53. 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'g on rehearing en bane 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.
1977).
54. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, 503(b)[04], at 45-47.
19801 1007
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
so for the purpose of obtaining legal rather than business advice;
fourth, the communication must pertain to the employee's per-
formance of his duties; and last, access to the communication must
be restricted to those who, because of their position within the cor-
porate structure, need to know the information. 5 By means of this
modified test, the Diversified court sought to effectuate the pur-
poses underlying the attorney-client privilege."
Applying the Weinstein test, the court accepted Dean Wig-
more's proposal57 that, absent a showing to the contrary, a matter
presented to a legal advisor is prima facie presented for purposes of
obtaining legal advice. Finding no contrary showing, the court con-
cluded that the information was given to the corporation's attor-
neys to obtain legal advice. In addition, the court summarily found
the remaining requirements of the Weinstein test satisfied." Thus,
the court applied the privilege very broadly, holding that most of
the requested documents were protected.
In recognizing the dichotomy between lower-level employees
and management, the Diversified test attempts to strike the deli-
cate balance between the corporation's need for protection of dis-
closures made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and the
need of the opposing litigant to obtain information within the cor-
poration's control. The test has been criticized, however, as failing
to define adequately the scope of the privilege." Although the court
placed the burden of proving each element of the test on the corpo-
ration because it has greatest access to the facts, the court also
55. The Diversified court defended its test as follows:
This modified Harper & Row test will better protect the purpose underlying the
attorney-client privilege. Under this test, the mere receipt of routine reports by the
corporation's counsel will not make the communication privileged, either because the
communication will have been made available to those who do not need to know or
because the communication was not made for the purpose of securing legal advice.
Moreover, application of the attorney-client privilege will do little to further encourage
this type of communication since they [sic] will continue to be made for independent
business reasons. By confining the subject matter of the communication to an em-
ployee's corporate duties, we remove from the scope of the privilege any communication
in which the employee functions merely as a fortuitous witness.
572 F.2d at 609.
56. Id.
57. Wigmore formulated as a generalized test:
[Tihe most that can be said by way of generalization is that a matter committed to a
professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed for the sake of the legal advice
which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore
within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal
advice.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2296, at 567 (emphasis in original).
58. 572 F.2d at 610.
59. See 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 265, 278-80.
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allowed that burden to be met by a prima facie showing that the
matter had been committed to an attorney. 0 Thus, the court
shifted the nearly insurmountable burden of disproving the prima
facie case to the individual adversary, who rarely has the resources
to discover the necessary information. In addition, subsequent
courts applied the standard unevenly 1 and thereby removed the
predictability that is a major reason for formulating any objective
test." Finally, the same criticisms directed at the Harper subject
matter test, such as its potential for abuse and its conflict with the
liberal discovery policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3
are applicable to the Diversified test.
Thus, the subject matter test, as formulated in Harper and
modified in Diversified, has proven no more immune to serious crit-
icism than the control group test. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
silent affirmance of Harper provides no guidance to lower federal
courts addressing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
and the scope of its protection. Hence, it is understandable that
decisions since Harper have shown no uniformity in defining appli-
cable standards and that the well-considered standards in Diversi-
fied have failed to fulfill their initial promise.
III. RECENT APPLICATION OF THE CORPORATE ATFORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
Despite predictions that the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
subject matter test had spelled the demise of the control group
test,6 ' several subsequent decisions reveal continued acceptance of
the control group standard by the majority of federal courts. 5
60. Id. at 279. The author points out that Wigmore formulated his test with individu-
als, not corporations, in mind, and that United Shoe indicated that the privilege applied to
all employees of the corporation. Thus, the author contends that "[bly removing Wigmore's
test from its simple context and applying it without the careful analysis characteristic of the
-remainder of the opinion, the court unravelled its carefully woven fabric." Id. at 279 n.81.
61. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., 453 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D.D.C. 1978) (refusing to
consider other elements of the Diversified test after determining that the corporation had
failed to show that its communication had been made f'r the purpose of securing legal ad-
vice); SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594, 597-98 (D.D.C. 1978) (refusing to
apply test because employee not acting as agent of the corporation when communication was
made); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, [1978-1] TRADE CAS. 1 62,043, at 74, 510-11
(D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1978) (formulating new test along lines of Diversified).
62. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
63. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
64. See, e.g., 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 759, 769 (1971) (concluding that "[t]here is little
doubt that this ruling has effectively delivered the death blow to the 'control group' test in
our federal courts").
65. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979) (agreeing with Judge
Weinstein that the matter conferred on must pertain to legal, not business, advice, but re-
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These decisions address the most common criticisms voiced by de-
tractors of the control group test and express concern about strik-
ing the balance between protection of the corporation's confidential
communications and compliance with the modern trend toward ex-
panded discovery.
A. Third Circuit: In re Grand Jury Investigation
In In re Grand Jury Investigation"6 the Third Circuit found
that the work product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor67 applied to
most of the questionnaires and interview memoranda prepared by
the corporation's outside counsel when its audit department dis-
covered evidence of illicit payments. Because the government had
shown good cause"8 to remove the documents of a deceased corpo-
rate employee from the qualified immunity of the work product
rule, however, the court went on to decide whether those docu-
ments could qualify for the absolute protection of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. In holding that the attorney-client privilege did not
apply, the court articulated several justifications for adopting the
control group test.
After recounting the development of the attorney-client privi-
lege in the corporate setting, the Third Circuit began its analysis
with the basic premise that "it is socially desirable to protect, at a
minimum, communications made by a person who has the author-
ity to take part in a decision about any action to be taken in re-
sponse to the solicited advice."" Extension of the protection be-
yond that minimum, the court reasoned, would depend on whether
such an extension would further the policy of frank communication
underlying the privilege.
Responding to criticism of the control group test, the court ini-
tially considered the individual-corporate structure dichotomy. The
court recognized the need for corporate attorneys to secure infor-
mation from lower-level employees, but questioned whether the
availability of the attorney-client privilege enhanced the attorney's
fusing to reach the issue of what employees may properly represent the client because it
found the communications protected under the work product doctrine of Hickman v. Tay-
lor). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979), and notes 66-75
infra; United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), and notes 76-83 infra.
66. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
67. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
68. Because the employee was dead, his testimony could not be duplicated by the gov-
ernment in the course of discovery. Thus, suppression of his recorded testimony, which was
in the hands of corporate counsel, would work a hardship on the opposing party. This fact
sufficed to take the testimony out of the work product protection of Hickman v. Taylor and
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See notes 18-19 supra.
69. 599 F.2d at 1235.
1010 [Vol. 33:999
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
ability to obtain that information. From the standpoint of the em-
ployee, the court argued, even the existence of a privilege does not
ensure confidentiality, since the decision whether to release the in-
formation to other employees, or to waive the privilege altogether
in the event of wrongdoing by the communicating employee, rests
with the corporation's decisionmakers. On the other hand, if no
wrongdoing is present, the employee would have little reason to
fear disclosure even in the absence of the privilege. Thus, the court
concluded that application of the attorney-client privilege to em-
ployees outside the corporation's control group would have little ef-
fect on the attorney's ability to obtain information. 0
The Third Circuit also rejected the suggestion that absence of
the privilege would make the attorney less inclined to seek out in-
formation detrimental to the corporation's interests, but necessary
for preparation of a thorough defense." Pointing to Hickman v.
Taylor, the court noted that information discovered in the course of
preparation for litigation would be protected by the qualified im-
munity of the work product doctrine, which adequately balances
the interests of the corporation against the liberal policies of dis-
covery. Conversely, the court felt that corporate counsel should not
be concerned about the unprivileged nature of communications ab-
sent the prospect of litigation." Finally, in reply to concerns that
denial of the privilege would discourage the corporation from con-
ducting internal investigations to uncover illicit behavior," the
court emphasized that the risk of civil or criminal liability for non-
compliance with laws regulating corporate activities sufficiently en-
sures such investigations even without the certainty of confidential-
ity. 4 In conclusion, the Third Circuit joined the majority of the
circuits in adopting the control group test."
70. Id. at 1236.
71. Id. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978),
rev'g on rehearing en banc 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). The court posed the dilemma:
The attorney dealing with a complex legal problem "is thus faced with a 'Hobson's
choice.' If he interviews employees not having 'the very highest authority,' their com-
munications to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews only
those with 'the very highest authority,' he may find it extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, to determine what happened."
572 F.2d at 609 (quoting Weinschel, supra note 28, at 876).
72. 599 F.2d at 1237.
73. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978)
rev'g on rehearing en banc 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF THE NEw YORK COUNTY LAWYERS Ass'N 7-10 (April 1970), cited in 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERaE, supra note 9, T 503[01], at 12 n.1.
74. 599 F.2d at 1237.
75. The court stated:
By adopting the majority approach, we would move the federal courts one step closer to
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B. Sixth Circuit: United States v. Upjohn Co.
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the question of the scope of
the corporate attorney-client privilege in United States v. Upjohn
Co.7 In Upjohn the Internal Revenue Service sought disclosure of
questionnaires and interview memoranda prepared by corporate
counsel as part of a management-induced investigation of alleged
illicit payments to foreign officials. Rejecting the subject matter
approach of Diversified, the Sixth Circuit restricted protection of
the attorney-client privilege to communications made by the corpo-
ration's control group.
The Upjohn court began its analysis with an examination of
the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege, pointing in
particular to the recognized purpose underlying the attorney-client
relationship-promoting justice by encouraging full disclosure. 78
Noting the problems involved in equating the individual and the
corporate client because of the division of duties within the corpo-
ration, 7' the court examined the functions of various levels of corpo-
rate employees and concluded that only top management personnel
possess characteristics sufficiently comparable to those of the cor-
poration as a whole."0 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit applied the at-
torney-client privilege only to communications made by such up-
per-level employees.
In adopting the control group test, the court directed several
criticisms at the subject matter test. First, the court noted that
adherence to the subject matter standard encourages top manage-
ment to remain ignorant of damaging facts. In addition, the court
emphasized that lower-level employees would be likely to bypass
corporate management and consult directly with the attorney.
Thus, the anomalous situation would be created in which the only
person within the corporation cognizant of all the relevant facts
would be the attorney protected by the privilege. Such a situation,
a uniform rule ....
In sum, we find no persuasive reason to deviate from the approach taken by the
majority of the federal courts. We believe that the control-group test is both broad
enough and flexible enough to accommodate the needs of a corporate client.
Id.
76. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
77. See note 4 supra.
78. 600 F.2d at 1225-26. The court stated that "[t]his policy of promoting full disclo-
sure to counsel serves to implement the notion inherent in the first principle, that finding
the truth and achieving justice in an adversary system are best served by fully-informed
advocates loyal to their client's [sic] interests." Id. at 1226.
79. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
80. 600 F.2d at 1226.
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stated the court, would be detrimental to the stockholders' interest
in sound management"' and the opposing litigant's interest in dis-
covery.82 Finally, because the privilege creates an absolute bar to
discovery, the court concluded that the privilege should be limited
in scope, protecting the corporation's interest in open communica-
tion while allowing a minimum of abuse. Rejecting the subject
matter test because of its tendency to create a broad "zone of si-
lence," the Upjohn court adopted the control group test.83
In response to the Sixth Circuit decision, Upjohn filed a peti-
tion for certiorari"4 in which it contended that, because modern cor-
porations typically operate over a wide geographical area, a uni-
form rule is needed to end the uncertainty surrounding the
privilege. In support of the subject matter test, Upjohn pointed to
the criticisms aimed at the control group test, including the bifur-
cated nature of the corporate structure, which, taken in conjunc-
tion with a narrow interpretation of the attorney-client privilege,
severely impedes corporate counsel's ability to obtain all relevant
information."5 Thus, Upjohn called upon the Supreme Court to pro-
vide guidelines for lower federal courts in determining the applica-
bility of the attorney-client privilege to corporate clients.
IV. COMMENT AND CONCLUSION
The conflicting policies that characterize the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege problem impede development of an objective
standard capable of easy application. Considerations such as the
nature of the advice received from the attorney, the range of situa-
tions giving rise to litigation, and the number and location of em-
ployees of the corporation for whom the privilege is sought influ-
ence the determination of the scope of the privilege. This
determination, however, must not be made on an ad hoc basis.8
81. Id. at 1227.
82. In the instant case, although some employees possessed the same knowledge as
corporate counsel, their dispersal throughout many foreign countries made discovery nearly
impossible. Id.
83. Id. See also text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
84. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, United States v. Upjohn Co., - U.S. - (19_)
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). The United States Supreme Court grant d
Upjohn Company's petition for certiorari on March 17, 1980. Upjohn Co. v. United States,
Docket No. 79-886 (March 17, 1980).
85. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 84, at 11-12.
86. As one commentator has noted, "an ad hoc approach to [the] privilege pursuant to
a vague standard achieves the worst of possible worlds: harm in the particular case because
information may be concealed; and a lack of compensating long-range benefit because per-
sisting uncertainty about the availability of the privilege will discourage some communica-
tions." Note, supra note 5, at 426. But see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules,
19801 1013
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
On the contrary, if the client is to feel confident of free and open
communication with his attorney-the only real justification for re-
taining the privilege-he must be able to predict with reasonable
certainty that the privilege will be applied to protect his disclo-
sures. Because the privilege provides absolute immunity from dis-
covery, however, its application should be limited so that it does no
more than protect the corporate client.
Although In re Grand Jury Investigation recognized the valid-
ity of the corporation's claim to the attorney-client privilege, it ar-
gued convincingly for a restriction of the privilege to thfose employ-
ees who exercise the authority to act upon the advice of the
attorney. Especially compelling was the court's contention that the
privilege is largely illusory for lower-level employees and thus pro-
vides little incentive for them to make damaging disclosures to cor-
porate counsel." Opponents of the control group standard have
sought to justify extension of the scope of the privilege by citing the
differences between employees with an intimate knowledge of rou-
tine activities and those with the discretion and authority to direct
these activities when supplied with information. If, as the Third
Circuit suggests, this dual nature actually has little impact on
whether the privilege aids corporate counsel in preparing for litiga-
tion, the balance tips strongly in favor of limiting the privilege to
prevent undue hardship to opposing litigants.
Concern about possible abuses of the attorney-client privilege
and about the tremendous difficulties in conducting pretrial discov-
ery of numerous and widely dispersed lower-level corporate em-
ployees characterized the Sixth Circuit decision in Upjohn. The
court reasoned that only top management personnel, who both con-
fer with counsel and act upon his advice, truly represent the corpo-
ration as "the client." Therefore, it concluded that only such per-
sonnel could invoke the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
This consideration strengthens the argument for expanding and fa-
cilitating discovery by limiting the scope of the privilege to the cor-
poration's control group.
The division among the federal courts concerning appropriate
application of the privilege undermines the privilege's sole justifi-
cation of ensuring open communication with corporate counsel. If
the privilege is to have any utility, corporations must be able to
determine which disclosures will be protected without being forced
to predict opposing counsel's forum choice. Delineating the difficul-
Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464 (1977); 23 VAND. L. RaV.
847 (1970).
87. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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ties faced by large national and multinational companies, Upjohn's
petition for certiorari asks the Supreme Court to provide guidelines
for applying the attorney-client privilege to assist companies in for-
mulating policies and obtaining the best possible legal advice. The
Supreme Court, however, should reject the liberal standards advo-
cated by Upjohn and adopt the control group test. This test, while
sufficiently protecting the corporation's interests by immunizing
communications made by its management from discovery, limits
the adverse effects of excluding information needed at trial from
discovery. By adopting the control group test, the Supreme Court
could resolve the controversy that has divided the federal courts for
nearly two decades and ensure that the attorney-client privilege
achieves its intended purpose.
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